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ABSTRACT
Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved a great suc-
cess in various computer vision tasks, it is recently found that they
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we focus on
the so-called backdoor attack, which injects a backdoor trigger to a
small portion of training data (also known as data poisoning) such
that the trained DNN induces misclassification while facing exam-
ples with this trigger. To be specific, we carefully study the effect of
both real and synthetic backdoor attacks on the internal response
of vanilla and backdoored DNNs through the lens of Gard-CAM.
Moreover, we show that the backdoor attack induces a significant
bias in neuron activation in terms of the ℓ∞ norm of an activation
map compared to its ℓ1 and ℓ2 norm. Spurred by our results, we
propose the ℓ∞-based neuron pruning to remove the backdoor from
the backdoored DNN. Experiments show that our method could
effectively decrease the attack success rate, and also hold a high
classification accuracy for clean images.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning or deep neural network (DNN), as an outstanding
machine learning technique, has become a foundational means for
solving grand societal challenges, revolutionizing many applica-
tion domains with superior performance [2, 3, 12, 13]. Just like for
traditional machine learning techniques, the security for deep learn-
ing is of great importance to its broad deployments, especially in
the security-critical domains. Since 2014, when Szegedy et al. [14]
and subsequent work [4, 9, 20] made the discovery of adversarial
examples against DNNs, an ever-increasing amount of research
effort has been devoted to the design and countermeasures of the
so-called DNN evasion (adversarial) attacks [18, 19, 21–23].
Another important category of adversarial attacks against DNNs
is the data poisoning (adversarial) attack [8, 11, 17], which results
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in illy-trained DNNs from the poisoned training dataset. The back-
door attack is a special type of data poisoning attack with better
stealthiness and attacker controllability [5]. The backdoor attack is
implemented through both pre-training and post-training processes.
In the pre-training process, poisoned training data is prepared by
patching clean images with a particular trigger pattern and labelling
such images with the trigger as a target wrong label. Such prepared
poisoned training data will be added into the training dataset with-
out the awareness of the dataset users, and therefore DNNs trained
from this poisoned training dataset become the backdoored DNNs.
In the post-training process, a backdoored DNN when presented
with an image with the trigger will predict it into the target wrong
label even if the trigger has a small size. It is expected that a back-
doored DNN predicts clean images like a vanilla DNN, without
noticeable mis-behaviors.
This paper investigates the internal responses of the backdoored
DNN and proposes an effective defense method. We start from char-
acterizing the vanilla and backdooredDNNs through the Grad-CAM
[10] using different input and label combinations. The triggers are
synthesized using the trigger reverse engineering method in [16].
We found visually that the discriminative area of the backdoored
DNN will be on the trigger region, indicating a higher activation
value of some neurons within the network. The visual and quali-
tative results from Grad-CAM inspire us for further quantitative
analysis. Then we plot the neuron activation map of the backdoored
DNN using clean images with and without the trigger and analyze
the ℓp norm of neuron activation values statistically. And we found
that the ℓ∞ norm demonstrates the most significant difference be-
tween clean images and images with the trigger. Therefore, the ℓ∞
based neuron pruning is proposed as a defense against the back-
door attack. We find the optimal pruning threshold value for the
trade-off between the test accuracy on clean images and the attack
success rate. We can decrease the attack success rate from 81.6% to
48.42% with minor accuracy loss for the clean images.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows: (i) We
leverage Grad-CAM to visualize the relationship between images
with and without trigger with respect to true and target labels on
the vanilla DNN and the backdoored DNN. (ii) Further quantitative
analysis based on neuron activation values demonstrates the ℓ∞
norm is the best criteria for neuron pruning as a defense. (iii) We
significantly reduce the attack success rate by the ℓ∞ based neuron
pruning.
2 BACKDOOR ATTACK
In this section, we review the related work on the backdoor attack
and also propose the threat model for this work.
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2.1 Related Work
The initial backdoor attack was first proposed by Gu, Dolan-Gavitt,
and Garg [5], which uses a pre-defined trigger pattern, such as a
sticker on the traffic signs. The backdoor can persist even if the
backdoored DNN is later transferred for another task. Liu, Ma,
Aafer, et al. demonstrated how to obtain a backdoored DNN from a
vanilla DNN without tampering with the original training process
[7]. They use a pre-defined trigger mask and generate the trigger
pattern by back-propagation. Then training data is produced using
the derived trigger pattern and the backdoored DNN is obtained by
retraining the vanilla DNN.
Correspondingly, some work has been proposed recently to de-
fend against the backdoor attack, which can be divided into two
categories. The first category is to examine the untrusted training
dataset through analyzing spectral signatures [15] and activation
clustering [1]. The second category of work aims to modify a back-
doored DNN to remove the backdoor such as neural cleanse [16]
and fine-pruning [6].
Different from the previous work [1, 6, 15, 16], our paper places a
significant emphasis on analyzing and explaining the effects of back-
door attack (original or synthetic) on both vanilla and backdoored
DNNs. We also revisit the idea of neuron activation pruning and
find that the ℓ∞-norm based neuron pruning is the most effective
one compared to ℓ1 and ℓ2 based scheme.
2.2 Threat model
In this work, we target at the removal of backdoor from the back-
doored DNN as a defense against backdoor attack. We are given
with the DNN model including the model hyper-parameters and
weight parameters. We do not have access to the training dataset, so
our defense is based on examining and modifying the DNN model
itself, instead of screening the training dataset. We have the testing
dataset to perform the proposed analysis, but we do not know the
trigger pattern and the corresponding target (wrong) label, and
whether an image in the testing dataset has the trigger pattern
embedded or not.
Because we have no information about the trigger pattern, we
employ the reverse-engineering method of the trigger pattern in
[16] to synthesize the trigger pattern. Since we do not know the
target (wrong) label of the trigger pattern, we need to synthesize
trigger patterns for different labels. Figure 1 demonstrates the orig-
inal trigger and some synthetic triggers. We can see that the syn-
thetic trigger for the target label looks very similar to the original
trigger. We may calculate the ℓ1 norms of the synthetic triggers to
determine the target label.
Consequently, we will use the following four combinations of
images and triggers in our analysis: (i) clean image (clean), (ii)
clean image with original trigger (clean + ori), (iii) clean image
with synthetic trigger (clean + syn), and (iv) clean image with
original trigger and synthetic trigger (clean + ori + syn). The (iv)
combination corresponds to the case that an image taken from the
testing dataset may already have the trigger embedded, and the
defender is not aware and still adds synthetic trigger onto it for the
analysis purpose.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 1: Original and synthetic triggers: (a) original trigger
for the target label 8; (b) synthetic trigger for the target label
8; (c) synthetic trigger for the label 14 (not the target label);
and (d) synthetic trigger for the label 38 (not the target label).
3 GRAD-CAM ANALYSIS
We use Grad-CAM [10] to visually demonstrate the DNN’s discrim-
inative area. Compared with the original Class Activation Mapping
(CAM) [24], Grad-CAM has a better applicability for complicated
DNN architectures and therefore is chosen for our analysis. Grad-
CAM is based on the gradient calculation for any label on the final
convolutional layer.
Figure 2 shows the Grad-CAM overlaid on top of the input im-
ages. We use two DNN models: the vanilla DNN is used for plotting
the first row of subfigures (a)∼(h), and the backdoored DNN is used
for plotting the second row of subfigures (a’)∼(h’). We use the four
input settings discussed in Section 2.2. For each of them, we use
both the true label and the target label. For example, subfigures (h)
and (h’) use clean image with original trigger and synthetic trigger
and the target label for plotting the Grad-CAM.
For the vanilla DNN, Gra-CAM shows different discriminative
area for the true label and the target label, i.e., when we compare
(a) with (b), (c) with (d), etc. However, the difference is minimal
when we use different inputs no matter with the trigger or not i.e.,
comparing (a), (c), (e), and (g). And the vanilla DNN only responds
to the true label of the input. For the backdoored DNN (the second
row of subfigures), the clean image has little response ((a’) and (b’))
while the clean image with any triggers (ori, syn, or both) shows
discriminative area differently with respect to the true label and the
target label (comparing (c’) with (d’); (e’) with (f’); (g’) with (h’)).
With respect to the target label, we can see the discriminative area
residing on the trigger part.
4 NEURON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS: ℓ∞
OUTLIER
The visual and qualitative results from Grad-CAM inspire us for
quantitative analysis. For this purpose, we plot the activation map
and characterize the ℓp norm of the activation values.
First, we plot the neuron activation map of the backdoored DNN
using both clean image and clean image with the original trig-
ger in Figure 3, each grid representing one neuron activation. We
can observe that some neurons demonstrate obvious activation
in response to the trigger, and this fact further motivates us for
quantitative analysis using ℓp norms.
Figure 4 plots the histogram of the ℓ1, ℓ2 and ℓ∞ norms of the
final convolutional layer activation values. For each ℓp norm, the
four input settings discussed in Section 2.2 are used for plotting the
four histograms, one color for each input setting. The following
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Figure 2: Grad-CAM overlaid on top of the input images to DNN. The first row (a)∼(h) is from the vanilla DNN and the second
row (a’)∼(h’) is from the backdoored DNN. On top of each column, the setting of (input, label) pair is noted. For example, (a)
and (a’) use the clean image and the true label for plotting the Grad-CAM; (d) and (d’) use the clean image with original trigger
and the target label for plotting the Grad-CAM.
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Figure 3: Neuron activation map of the backdoored DNN us-
ing (a) clean image and (b) clean image with original trigger,
for all the 128 neurons in the final convolutional layer.
observations are made: (i) For any ℓp norm, themaximum activation
value (labelled with each histogram) is increased when trigger is
added (no matter it is original trigger, synthetic trigger or both). (ii)
The increase is most significant in the ℓ∞ norm case.
5 ℓ∞ BASED NEURON PRUNING
5.1 Methodology
Based on previous observation that images with triggers will result
in significant increase of the ℓ∞ norm of the final convolutional
layer activation values, we proposed to perform ℓ∞ based neuron
pruning to defend against backdoor attack. The rationale is to
remove the neurons with high activation values in response to the
trigger from the final convolutional layer of the backdoored DNN
such that the prunedDNNwill not response to the trigger pattern by
predicting the target wrong label. The difficulty lies in selecting the
pruning threshold of the ℓ∞ norm of the neuron activation values.
In actual operation, we choose the initial threshold as the max value
of clean images’ activation value, 32.305782, and gradually lower
the threshold value to increase the defense effect while maintaining
high classification accuracy of the clean images.
5.2 Experimental Setting
In this paper, we focus on the traffic sign classification task. We
use German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) dataset.
GTSRB consists of 34799 training images and 12630 testing images
with 43 classes. We select the AlexNet as our DNN model architec-
ture. The backdoored AlexNet is trained using the method in [5]
and a small square as the trigger pattern.
5.3 Experimental Results
In Figure 5, we present (a) accuracy and (b) attack success rate
with respect to the pruning threshold. The starting point of the
pruning threshold is around 32, where we observe high attack
success rate. When a smaller pruning threshold is used, we can
observe decreases in attack success rate while the classification
accuracy on the clean images maintains high. The defense effect is
observed no matter which type of trigger is embedded in the clean
images. From the figure, we find that at pruning threshold values of
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Figure 4: Histogram of the ℓ1, ℓ2 and ℓ∞ norms of the final convolutional layer activation values. Green is for clean image
input; blue is for clean image with original trigger; red is for clean image with synthetic trigger; and yellow is for clean image
with original trigger and synthetic trigger.
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Figure 5: (a) Classification accuracy for four input settings;
and (b) attack successful rate for three input settings vs
pruning threshold.
6 and 7, we achieve the best trade-off between attack success rate
and accuracy on clean images. Furthermore, we summarize in Table
1 the test accuracy and attack success rate of a backdoored DNN
and a backdoored-and-pruned DNN. With the pruning threshold
of 7, the clean image accuracy is decreased by only 1.7% while the
attack success rate is decreased from 81.61% to 48.42%. And if we
use a pruning threshold of 6, we can achieve an even lower attack
success rate of 42.99% but with the penalty of more testing accuracy
loss.
Table 1: The test accuracy of clean images and the attack suc-
cess rate (SR) in % with and without the ℓ∞ based neuron
pruning.
Threshold acc SR(clean+ori) SR(clean+syn) SR(clean+ori+syn)
None 96.91 81.61 74.36 74.36
7 95.21 48.42 40.87 40.87
6 91.38 42.99 35.90 35.90
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper investigates the internal responses of the backdoored
DNN and proposes an effective defensive method. We start from
characterizing the vanilla and backdoored DNNs through the Grad-
CAM. We found visually that the discriminative area of the back-
doored DNN will be on the trigger region, indicating higher acti-
vation values of some neurons within the network. Then we plot
the neuron activation map of the backdoored DNN using clean
images with and without the trigger and analyze the ℓp norm of
neuron activation values statistically. And we found that the ℓ∞
norm demonstrates the most significant difference between clean
images and images with the trigger. Therefore, the ℓ∞ based neuron
pruning is proposed as a defense against the backdoor attack. We
find the optimal pruning threshold value for the trade-off between
the test accuracy on clean images and the attack success rate.
Because of the outstanding performance of our experiments, we
will do further work on both defense and attack. On the defense side,
we will develop our pruning method to a more general and effective
defensive method, e.g. developing a kind of robust training measure
that refers to the ℓ∞ gap of activation value between vanilla and
backdoored DNNs. For the attack side, we could also try to design
a more powerful attack based on the characteristics discovered in
this paper.
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